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The dynamic nature of family law is well illustrated by the issue of
cohabitation. In some corners, discouraged, in others, favored-cohabitation, or
the residential union of two romantic partners outside of marriage-has
encountered many social, legislative, and judicial reactions.
With the rate of cohabitation continuing to rise, it is important to
consider the law relating to cohabitation,' particularly that governing the end of a
cohabitation. Such an end may be triggered by a cohabitant's death or the
breakup of the relationship 2 -only ten percent of cohabitants not married within
five years remain together.3 Upon the end of a cohabitation, many concerns
arise, often involving property division. Occasionally, issues related to
childbearing also appear-33.8% of births in the United States in 2002 were
nonmarital, many the result of cohabitation.4
The current absence of a comprehensive law on cohabitation, however,
requires many of these problems to be collaterally addressed by the law, such as
through paternity or contract law. This collateral approach is typically triggered
only upon the end of the relationship, when legal resolution and intervention is
often necessary to wind down the relationship. The necessity of comprehensive
legal regulation of cohabitation, however, is the subject of both great debate and
this Article.
Despite a dynamic discussion on cohabitation,' the law on cohabitation
has remained static in recent years. There may be numerous reasons for this, not
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' In recent years, cohabitation has been the subject of academic scholarship, but not of significant
legal change. For a sampling of the literature on cohabitation, see Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L.
Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should Cohabitation Be the (Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REV. 403
(2004); Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42
FAM. L.Q. 309 (2008) [hereinafter Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation]; see also infra note 17 and
accompanying text
2 Cohabitation, by current definition, falls outside of legal regulation. This would likely remain
uncontroversial if all cohabitations were successful and thus no issues attendant to their breakup
ever arose. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 322. However, "approximately 60% of all
U.S. cohabitants and 70% of those in a first, premarital cohabitation marry within five years." Id.
4 Id. at 314. This is as opposed to only 3.8% of nonmarital births in the United States in 1940. Id.
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the least of which is that many cohabitants intend to exist outside the law.
Furthermore, cohabitation may be difficult to legally characterize-even the level
of commitment differs among cohabitating couples.
Given the resilience of the issues surrounding cohabitation, a
comparative analysis might offer a new perspective. This Article, therefore,
considers cohabitation in Poland and the United States, limiting itself to opposite-
sex couples.7 These two countries have been selected for analysis because,
despite their lack of comprehensive law on cohabitation, they have each
encountered and dealt with the issues arising from such relationships. They
have done so differently, offering the opportunity for comparative analysis.9
Part II of this Article therefore begins by surveying American law on
cohabitation, while Part III surveys equivalent Polish law. Part IV compares and
analyzes the issues arising from cohabitations in both countries, offering
concluding thoughts on the legal treatment of nonmarital cohabitation, given that
many of these relationships intend to exist outside of legal regulation.
5 For a review of the literature on cohabitation, see Lynne Marie Kohm & Karen M. Groen,
Cohabitation and the Future of Marriage, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 261 (2005). See also supra note
1.
6 Professor Garrison notes the various cohabitation types, which range from negligible
commitment, to a step in the marriage process, to informal marriage. See Garrison, Nonmarital
Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 323.
7 For a discussion of the corresponding issues in same-sex relationships, see, for example,
Symposium, Breaking With Tradition: New Frontiers for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 65 (2005); Symposium, Can Anyone Show Just Cause Why These Two Should Not Be
Lawfully Joined Together?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REv. 487 (2004); Same-Sex Marriage Symposium
Issue, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 273 (2004); A.B.A. Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An Analysis
of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q.
339 (2004). For a discussion of the legal remedies following the breakup of a same-sex
cohabitation, see, for example, Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735 (Wash. 2001).
8 For a comparative approach to cohabitation in China and the United States, see Annie Y. Wang,
Unmarried Cohabitation: What Can We Learn from a Comparison Between the United States and
China?, 41 FAM. L.Q. 197 (2007). For the legal approaches of other countries to cohabitation, see
infra notes 9, 67, 108, 113; see also Erin Cleary, Note, New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act in the
Aftermath of Lewis v. Harris: Should New Jersey Expand the Act to Include All Unmarried
Cohabitants?, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 519, 528-30 (2008).
9 See Bill Atkin, The Legal World of Unmarried Couples: Reflections on "De Facto Relationships"
in Recent New Zealand Legislation, 39 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 793, 793-94 (2009).
There are several [legal] approaches [to cohabitation] that can be taken, for
example: laissez faire, leaving the parties to rely on the general law for any
remedy; an "opt-in" scheme, which enables parties to jointly sign up to a
legislatively determined regime (or perhaps to choose from more than one
option); a special statutory scheme that is imposed on the parties, possibly with
an opt-out mechanism; or the equation of unmarried relationships with
marriage (and civil unions or registered partnerships if they exist in the
country).
Id. But see infra note 144.
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II. COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Cohabitation in the United States'o is largely a legally unprotected status
that confers no rights or obligations on cohabitants, despite some initial case law
on the topic in the 1970s that made inroads into its judicial recognition."
Cohabitation, in both its rights and obligations, therefore remains separate and
legally distinct from marriage in the United States. This legal treatment of
cohabitation has remained static over the years, even though the cohabitation rate
has been rising, which, in turn, has prompted many issues for courts to resolve
upon the end of cohabitations.
A. Background on Cohabitation in the United States
Cohabitation has historically been discouraged by most states' laws,
especially before the 1970s. This discouragement manifested itself in both social
disapproval and the lack of remedies upon the dissolution of the cohabiting
relationship.12 As is often the case, it is unclear whether law influenced public
policy against cohabitation or vice versa.
Much of the opposition to cohabitation has been rooted in public policy
reasons that ranged from the disapproval of sexual relationships outside of
marriage to concern for women and children of unstable cohabitations. 3 Many
10 It is not easy to define "cohabitation." See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. But see
infra notes 57, 111-13 and accompanying text.
" For the argument that Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), although progressive on the
topic of cohabitation, failed to increase the success of these claimants, see Garrison, Nonmarital
Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 322. This is not to say that Marvin has been ignored by courts. See
Kohm & Groen, supra note 5, at 266 n.43:
Included among the states which have followed the Marvin approach are
Minnesota (Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977)) and New Jersey
(Koslowski v. Koslowski, 403 A.2d 902 (1979)). Other states have accepted
some, but not all of the grounds for recovery sanctioned by Marvin. See, e.g.,
Marone v. Marone, 50 N.Y.2d 481 (1980); Tapley v. Tapley, 122 N.H. 727
(1982). Some states follow minimal aspects of Marvin. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 513.075 (2004); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.108 (Vernon 1998).
Id.
12 See, e.g., Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (noting
Louisiana's interest in discouraging "relationships which serve to erode the cornerstone of society,
i.e., the family"); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (111. 1979) (rejecting the contract claims
between unmarried cohabitants due to a public policy disfavoring "private contractual alternatives
to marriage").
13 See, eg, Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) ("Meretricious sexual
relationships are by nature repugnant to social stability, and our courts have on sound public policy
declined to reward them by allowing a money recovery therefore.") For a discussion regarding the
protection of children from the full consequences of a failed cohabitation, see Israel L. Kunin &
James M. Davis, Pitfalls and Promises: Cohabitation, Marriage and Domestic Partnerships:
Article: Protecting Children and the Custodial Rights of Co-Habitants, 22 J. AM. AcAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 29 (2009); see also supra note 12 and infra note 138.
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commentators have further pointed to research suggesting the benefits of
marriage when compared to cohabitation.14
The general societal disapproval of cohabitation has meant a very short
history of cohabitation in the United States. Not until the 1970s did cohabitation
begin to more frequently appear both in society and in the literature, before
which it was "statistically and socially invisible.""s Several factors may have
influenced this drastic change, including shifting societal views of marital and
non-marital relationships.16
Whatever the reason, however, there is no question that the recent
increase of cohabitation has been dramatic. There were fewer than 500,000
opposite-sex cohabiting couples in 1960, but 4.9 million such couples in 2000.1
Despite this increase of cohabitation in recent years, American law has not
comprehensively addressed cohabitation, instead adopting the piecemeal
approach considered next. The possible reasons for this approach-not the least
of which is that many cohabitations intend to exist outside legal regulation-are
considered in Part IV.
B. American Law on Cohabitation
Family law predominantly falls within the domain of the states, and there
is no one consistent legal approach to cohabitation among the states. 8
14 William C. Duncan, The Social Good of Marriage and Legal Responses to Non-Marital
Cohabitation, 82 OR. L. REv. 1001, 1005-13 (2003) (outlining research suggesting that cohabitants
are less faithful to each other, less happy, less wealthy, and less stable than married couples); see
also Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 409 (noting that cohabitation reduces the partners' chances of
future marital success).
15 Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 4 (2007) (citing Kathleen Kiernan, European Perspectives on
Union Formation, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 40, 42
(Linda J. Waite ed., 2000) ("It was statistically invisible both because it was not very common and
because it could not be reliably studied until large-scale surveys and longitudinal studies were
undertaken. And it was socially invisible because, as I describe below, the phenomenon was
largely confined to lower-income and less-educated people.") Sociologist Eleanor Macklin
determined 1966-1975 as the point at which cohabitation gained greater social acceptance. Eleanor
D. Macklin, Nonmarital Heterosexual Cohabitation: An Overview, in CONTEMPORARY FAMILIES
AND ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLES 49, 52 (Eleanor D. Macklin & Roger H. Rubin eds., 1983).
16 For a discussion on these factors, see, for example, infra notes 52-54.
17 Bowman, supra note 15, at 7.
18 See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) ("Family relations are a traditional area of
state concern.") Justice Antonin Scalia, however, has expressed concern about the federalization of
American family law:
I think it obvious ... that we will be ushering in a new regime of judicially
prescribed, and federally prescribed, family law. I have no reason to believe
that federal judges will be better at this than state legislatures; and state
legislatures have the great advantages of doing harm in a more circumscribed
area, of being able to correct their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable
by the people.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Nonetheless, California's approach, outlined in the watershed case Marvin v.
Marvin,9 now embodies the approach of many states.20
At issue in Marvin was the six-year cohabitation of a Hollywood
couple.2 1 Upon the end of the relationship, Michelle Marvin brought suit against
Lee Marvin for declaratory relief, asking the court to determine her contract and
property rights.2 2 These claims were based upon an alleged oral promise between
the Marvins that Michelle would render services to Lee as companion,
homemaker, housekeeper, and cook, surrendering her career as an entertainer and
singer in exchange for Lee's financial support for the rest of her life.23 Shortly
after the relationship ended, however, Lee stopped supporting her, prompting
Michelle to bring a lawsuit for continued support.
The California Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that the
terms of the contract as alleged by Michelle did not rely upon any unlawful
consideration, providing a basis for declaratory relief.25 The court further held
that express contracts between nonmarital partners should be judicially enforced
unless explicitly founded upon the consideration of meretricious sexual
services.26 The court also concluded that if cohabitants lacked an express
contract, the court should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine
whether that conduct demonstrated an implied contract, agreement of partnership
or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties.27 To
resolve these types of cases, the Marvin court suggested the use of the doctrine of
quantum meruit or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts.28
Given the strong public policy reasons at the time against both the
acknowledgement of cohabitation and the enforcement of cohabitation
agreements, 2 9 the Marvin decision was relatively radical.3 0 Nonetheless, Marvin
was not the limitless sanction of cohabitation remedies as often portrayed-
Michelle received little relief from the subsequent remand and appeal.3
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court's opinion included language that
could constrict cohabitants' contractual freedom by allowing courts to inquire
into the parties' "conduct" and "the nature of their relationship."
'9 557 P.2d 106, 121-22 (Cal. 1976).20 Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 315; see also supra note 11.
21 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.22 1d at 111.
23 Id at 110.
24 id.
2 Id. at 116.2 6 Id. at 122.
27 Id.
28 Id at 122-23; see infra Part IV.B and note 127.
29 See supra Part II.A.
30 See Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 315; see also supra note 11.
31 Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 317.
32 David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law
Institute's Principles ofFamily Dissolution, 76 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1467, 1470 (2001).
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At the opposite end of the spectrum of states' positions on cohabitation
was Hewitt v. Hewitt. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
cohabitation did not trigger any property rights.34 The court noted, "[t]he issue,
realistically, is whether it is appropriate for this court to grant a legal status to a
private arrangement substituting for the institution of marriage sanctioned by the
State."3  The court decided that this was inappropriate.36
Nonetheless, as Marsha Garrison underscores, appellate courts in at least
half the states have now permitted contract claims between cohabitants, although
a few have rejected recovery based on implied contract. Meanwhile, five states,
including Illinois, have disallowed any relief based on a cohabiting relationship.
In every American jurisdiction, however, the legal rights and obligations
of cohabitants are fewer than those of spouses.39  For one, there is no
comprehensive law on cohabitation, with many relevant issues being addressed
by the law collaterally. Furthermore, although in many states cohabitants can
jointly adopt,40 qualify for protection under state domestic violence legislation, 41
and receive certain judicial remedies following their breakup,42 cohabitants do
not have the full rights and obligations of marriage.43 Finally, many states have
1 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
3
4 Id. at 1211.
3 Id. at 1209.
36 Id. at 1211. For commentary on Hewitt, see Mark Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI
Domestic Partners Recommendation, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1148-1153 (2001).
37 Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 315-16.
3 These include Illinois, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, and Michigan. Id. at 316 & n.29.
See infra note 43.
40 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Carl, 709 N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000). But see Catherine L.
Hartz, Arkansas's Unmarried Couple Adoption Ban: Depriving Children of Families, 63 ARK. L.
REV. 113 (2010) (discussing the banning of adoption by cohabitants); Mark Strasser, Adoption, Best
Interests, and the Arkansas Constitution, 63 ARK. L. REV. 3 (2010) (discussing the same).
4' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 2006);
Wis. STAT. § 813.12 (2007-08).
42 Mark Glover, Evidentiary Privileges for Cohabiting Parents: Protecting Children Inside and
Outside of Marriage, 70 LA. L. REV. 751, 755-57 (2010). For further discussion of the rights of
cohabitants, see id. at 754-761.
43 For example, the spousal privilege regarding adverse testimony and confidential communications
does not extend to cohabiting couples. Katherine M. Forbes, Note, Time for a New Privilege:
Allowing Unmarried Cohabitating Couples to Claim the Spousal Testimony Privilege, 40 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 887, 888 (2007). Also, "[c]ourts seem particularly hesitant to allow cohabitational
partners to recover in tort actions, such as loss of consortium." Alisha M. Carlile, Note, Like
Family: Rights of Nonmarried Cohabitational Partners in Loss of Consortium Actions, 46 B.C. L.
REV 391, 392 (2005). Another tort action for which unmarried cohabitants rarely recover is
bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Meredith E. Green, Comment,
Who Knows Where the Love Grows?: Unmarried Cohabitants and Bystander Recovery for
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1093, 1093 (2009). Finally,
cohabitants rarely have automatic inheritance rights. Jennifer Berhorst, Note, Unmarried
Cohabitating Couples: A Proposal for Inheritance Rights under Missouri Law, 76 UMKC L. REV.
1131, 1144 (2008). These are only a few examples of the marital privileges and obligations that
cohabitants do not possess.
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continued to outlaw fornication and cohabitation," and the cohabitation of an ex-
spouse creates grounds to end alimony.45
In light of this piecemeal legal approach of most states, in 2001, the
influential American Law Institute proposed ALI Principles on the subject of
cohabitation to serve as model legislation for the states.4 These principles
defined domestic partners as "two persons of the same or opposite sex, not
married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a primary
residence and a life together as a couple."A The principles would recognize a
domestic partnership status and grant legal implications for the termination of a
cohabitation similar to those upon the dissolution of marriage. However, the
principles have not catalyzed states to pass comprehensive state law on
cohabitation and have been criticized.49
In sum, American law on cohabitation is a patchwork of provisions that
differ from state to state with the result that most issues arising from cohabitation
are addressed by the law on a collateral basis, such as through paternity or
contract law. A parallel situation has arisen in foreign countries, including
Poland, where there is likewise no comprehensive law on cohabitation.
III. COHABITATION IN POLAND
One of the key examples of the evolution of family law was the shift
away from the traditional type of marriage wherein the husband was the bread
winner and the wife was a homemaker.50 However, this evolution of marriage in
adjustment to people's preferences and realities has not stopped the increase of
cohabitations and their consequent replacement of many marriages in Poland."
" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 798.02 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
345 (2010); see also Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation For Opposite
Sex Couples, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135 (2005).
45 See, e.g., Linstroth v. Dorgan, 2 So. 3d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (terminating alimony upon
showing of cohabitation); Bird v. Bird, 688 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2009) (holding the same); Black v.
Black, 199 P.3d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (holding the same).
4 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION, ch. 6
(2000).
4 71 Id. § 6.01.
481 Id. § 6.02
49 For a criticism of these principles, see, for example, Westfall, supra note 32, at 1467. But see
Strasser, supra note 36.
so Also changing has been American society's perception of marriage. Jared Richards, Note,
Turning a Blind Eye to Unmarried Cohabitants: A Look at How Utah Laws Affect Traditional
Protections, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 215, 216 (2007) ("A number of social factors such as women's
suffrage, mobility, the civil rights movement, reproductive technology, and divorce reform, have
shaped the way we view marriage.").
s1 Andrzej Szlqzak, Cohabitation Without Marriage in Poland, 5 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 1, 2-3 (1991)
[hereinafter Szlqzak, Cohabitation Without Marriage in Poland] ("However, even in the absence of
statistics, there is no doubt that the incidence of cohabitation has increased in recent years."). In
Poland, there are two forms of getting married. Future spouses can choose a civil marriage or a
religious marriage with civil consequences-only these marriages are recognized by law. One of
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As cohabitation continues to increase in prominence, it is important to evaluate
the background and legal status of these types of relationships in Poland.
A. Background on Cohabitation in Poland
In Poland, cohabitation is more common today than a few years ago,52
but not as popular as in other countries. Nonetheless, cohabitation has become
a social phenomenon, with more people deciding to cohabit every year due to a
preference to avoid the regulation of their relationship by law. In other words,
cohabitants do not want to obey the given rules for marriage-preferring the
possibility of establishing their own rules.54 This does not necessarily mean,
however, that the law on marriage is inflexible or that it deprives spouses of the
freedom to create the rules concerning their relations. Furthermore, it is not
harsh or difficult to divorce." Even so, many cohabiting couples desire to avoid
the legal consequences of marriage.
The term "cohabitation"5 6 was originally used to name the relationship
between a woman and a man," but nowadays also applies to same-sex couples.ss
the types of cohabitation is a religious marriage, i.e., a marriage made in the church under church
law, but not necessarily in the Roman Catholic Church-it can be any church. Religious marriages,
without civil consequences, are treated under Polish law as unmarried cohabitations. See, e.g.,
TADEUSZ SMYCZYNSKI, PRAwo RODZINNE I OPIEKURCZE 28-40 (2009). Religious marriages may
also be known as "de facto marriages" (matteistwa faktyczne). See Miroslaw Nazar, Prawo
Rodzinne i Opiekuricze, in 11 SYSTEM PRAWA PRYWATNEGO 933 (2009).
52 The rate of so-called informal marriages grew from 1.3% of all marriages in 1988 to 2.2% in
2002. See Monika Mlynarska & Laura Bernardi, Meaning and Attitudes Attached to Cohabitation
in Poland, 16 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 520-554 (2007). For corresponding American data, see
Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 313. Professor Garrison reported that in the
United States, between 1970 and 2000, the number of cohabitations rose almost ten-fold-from
523,000 to 4,880,000. Id
s3 For data on cohabitation, see, for example, Kathleen Kiernan, Unmarried Cohabitation and
Parenthood in Britain and Europe, 26 LAW & POL'Y 33-55 (2004).
54 See Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Could We? Should We?, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 279,
283-84 (2008) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Garrison, Reviving Marriage]:
An important reason why marriage is controversial is that it is in decline. All
across the industrialized world, young adults are marrying later and increasing
numbers may not marry at all. Those who do marry face a relatively high
probability that their relationships will terminate in divorce. As a result of
these convergent trends, today's adults spend, on average, a smaller proportion
of their adult lives within a marital household than did their ancestors.
5 Tadeusz Smyczyfiski, Czy Potrzebna Jest Regulacja Prawna Potycia Konkubenckiego
(71eteroseksualnego i Homoseksualnego)?, in PRAWO RODZINNE W POLSCE I w EUROPIE:
ZAGADNIENIA WYBRANE 462 (Piotr Kasprzyk ed., 2005).
s6 In this context, the term "cohabitation" is more appropriate for both same- and opposite-sex
couples than the term "concubinage." The opinion in Poland regarding whether the term
"concubinage (konkubinat)" should be used to refer to same-sex couples is divided. Interestingly,
the official translation of the French Civil Code uses the term "concubinage" to refer to both same-
and opposite-sex couples. CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 515-8 (Fr.), available at
http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_22.pdf
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Generally, however, no Polish legislation uses the terms "cohabitation" or
"concubinage," 9 instead using the terms "close persons" or people "being in de
facto relationships," "living together," "being in intimate relations," or "actually
cohabiting."
Of course, cohabiting relationships are various-their extent and level of
intimacy can differ. Some cohabitants are so intimate that they may not differ
from spouses; for example, the cohabitants' personal and property relations are
the same as between spouses-they hold property together as a married couple
would. On the other hand, there are cohabitants whose personal relations are
very strong, but not their property relations.60 Although the property relations of
cohabitants do not currently have any legal meaning in Poland, it cannot be
denied that such relations could cement the relationship.
Nonetheless, the common characteristic of all cohabitations is a
relationship wherein the cohabitants presume long-lasting cohabitation, despite
its lack of formal basis. The crucial feature of cohabitation is therefore the
permanent consent of being together-temporary relationships and accidental
acquaintances do not constitute cohabitations.6 2 The lack of such consent at any
point in the relationship causes its breakdown. In marriage, meanwhile, such
consent to be together is important at wedlock, but its latter absence does not end
the marriage-additional circumstances must arise for a spouse to file a lawsuit
for divorce.6 3
The key element of cohabitation is the common home.6" The temporary
separation of cohabitants caused by extraordinary circumstances, however, does
not preclude the couple from being cohabitants. Furthermore, two-home-
cohabitations are possible when cohabitants have two homes but their
relationship is based upon commitment, co-acting, mutual help, and the
commitment of both parties' activities to the fulfilment of their common needs.
s7 See the definition given by Wanda Stojanowska, who wrote that cohabitation is "a real union
between a man and a woman who live together in a way parallel to married life without being
married." Wanda Stojanowska, Poland: Cohabitation, 27 J. FAM. L. 275, 275 (1988-1989).
58 Smyczyiiski, supra note 55, at 462. It should be added, however, that there are some doubts
regarding this definition. See Nazar, supra note 51, at 909-10.
5 There is only one piece of legislation using the term "concubinage." See ustawa z 22 stycznia
1999 r. o ochronie informacji niejawnych [Classified Information Protection Act of Jan. 22, 1999],
Dz. U. z 2005 r., nr 196, poz. 1631 ze zm.
60 In such cases, for example, each cohabitant keeps a separate apartment, but decisions are
undertaken by both as if they were spouses.
61 See Uchwala S4du Najwytszego z dnia 30 stycznia 1986 r., III CZP 79/85 [decision of the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland of 30 Jan. 1986].
62 This feature of cohabitation is not, however, highlighted in the law applied to cohabitation.
63 See KODEKS RODZINNY I OPIEKUNCZY [KRO] [Family and Guardianship Code of Feb. 25, 1964]
art. 56. This Code came into force on Jan. 1, 1965.
6 See, e.g., Andrzej Szlqzak, STOSUNKI MAJATKOWE MiDzY KONKUBENTAMI: ZAGADNIENIA
WYBRANE 16 (1992).
65 See Nazar, supra note 51, at 918.
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Presently, the legal status of same-sex couples is similar to that of
opposite-sex cohabitants-cohabitations are not legally recognized6 6 and such
unions are rare. Although Poland's neighbor Germany has introduced law
regarding same-sex couples,67 Poland has not yet done so. Currently, the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that marriage is a relationship
between a woman and a man.68 Same-sex couples therefore could not be married
without a change to the Constitution.69 One possible solution is to decide that the
appellation "marriage" will not be used to describe such relationships.70
Nonetheless, with regard to both same-sex and opposite-sex cohabitation, no
comprehensive regulation currently exists in Poland.
B. Polish Law on Cohabitation
In Poland, there is no law imposing negative consequences upon
cohabitation,7 which is in accordance with Recommendation No. R (88) 3 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on the validity of contracts between
persons living together as unmarried couples and their testamentary
dispositions.72 This approach to cohabitation may be described as neutral and
pragmatic.73
While Polish law generally remains indifferent to the set up and break
down of cohabitations, Polish legislators have given cohabitants some rights due
to the increasing rate of cohabitation. In certain situations, cohabitants receive
protection "based on social, moral, and humane consideration." 74 Many of the
legal consequences of cohabitation, however, are the result of a close relation
between the partners, a common home, the maintenance of a common household,
or a common livelihood.
6 However, this approach has been criticized. See, e.g., Michal Plachta, 0 Prawie Odmowy
Zenznai Osoby Najblitszej, 10 PASTWO I PRAwo 66 ff(1988).
67 See Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften:
Lebesnpartnerschaften vom 16.2.2001, verkiindet in Jahrgang 2001 Nr. 9 vom 22.2.2001. England
has also been considering cohabitation legislation. See infra note 108; see also R.J. Probert, A
Review of Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relation-ship Breakdown, Law Com. No.
307 (HMSO 2007), 41 FAM. L.Q. 521 (2007).
68 See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] art. 18 (Poland). According to
this provision "[miarriage, being a union of a man and a woman, as well as the family, motherhood
and parenthood, shall be placed under the protection and care of the Republic of Poland." Id.
69 See Elibieta Skowrofiska-Bocian, Family and Succession Law, in INTRODUCTION TO POLISH LAW
87 (Stanislaw Frankowski ed., 2005).
70 Using another term, but giving same-sex couples the same rights as spouses, could permit
circumvention of the constitutional law. See Nazar, supra note 51, at 946.
7 Neither same- nor opposite-sex cohabitation is forbidden by Polish law.
72 The recommendation was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on Mar. 7, 1988, at the 415th
meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, ON THE
VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN PERSONS LIVING TOGETHER AS AN UNMARRIED COUPLE AND
THEIR TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS (Mar. 7, 1988).
7 SzlQzak, Cohabitation Without Marriage in Poland, supra note 51, at 3.
74 Stojanowska, supra note 57, at 278.
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It is significant that the Polish Supreme Court (Sqd Najwyiszy) noted
that cohabitation has a permanent place in the system of moral standards and
principles in modem society,75 implying the necessity of taking cohabitation into
account when interpreting legislation that uses terms such as "member of family"
or "close person." Nonetheless, this statement should be supplemented with
reservations-according to the KRO,76 "family" consists of spouses and their
children. Some provisions expand this definition to further relatives, but
cohabitants, according to the KRO, are not a family. They can be treated as a
family only in other situations than those mentioned in the KRO, and the
conclusion that cohabitants are family could be derived only after a complex
examination of the features of the given relationship. Another important
observation is that the KRO regulates relations between parents and children
even in the context of cohabitants' rights-this regulation is not connected with
the parents' marital status.n
Polish regulations on cohabitation can be divided into four groups. The
first one consists of provisions taking into account people who live together in an
intimate relationship. 78 The second includes provisions using the term "close
person"7 or "closest person."so Importantly, these provisions include the
guaranteed right of refusal to testify in a criminal case against a cohabitant81 and
the protected right to occupy the common apartment.8 2 The third group of
regulations on cohabitation takes into consideration the keeping of a common
household.8 ' Finally, the last group of provisions uses the terms "family" and
7 See Wyrok S4du Najwytszego z dnia 13 kwietnia 2005 r., IV CK 648/04 [decision of the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland of 13 Apr. 2005]. In this decision, the Court confirmed
the opinion that art. 446 § 3 KC should be applied to cohabitants. This provision guarantees that,
upon the death of a person as a result of tort, "the closest family members," whom the deceased
voluntarily and permanently provided with means of substance, may demand an annuity from the
person obliged to redress the damage.
76 KODEKS RODZINNY I OPIEKU1lCZY [KRO] [Family and Guardianship Code of Feb. 25, 1964], Dz.
U. nr 9, poz. 59 with amendments. This Code came into force on Jan. 1, 1965.
7 Szlqzak, Cohabitation Without Marriage in Poland, supra note 51.
78 See art. 691 KODEKS CYWILNY [KC] [Civil Code of Apr. 23, 1964], Dz. U. nr 16, poz. 93 with
amendments. This Code came into force on Jan. 1, 1965. See also art. 115 § 11 KODEKS KARNY
[KK] [Criminal Code of Jun. 6, 1997], Dz. U. nr 88, poz. 553 with amendments.
79 See, e.g., art. 446 § 2 KC; art. 908 § 3 KC.
so See art. 115 § 11 KK.
8 Notably, the prevailing opinion is that a cohabitant is not a "close person" according to the
KODEKS POSThPOWANIA CYWILNEGO [Code of Civil Procedure of 17 Nov. 1964] and therefore has
no privilege to refuse to testify. Compare Tadeusz Erecifiski, Jacek Gudowski, & Maria
Jqdrzejewska, Komentarz: Czqid Pierwsza-Postqpowanie Rozpoznawcze. Czqid Druga-
Postqpowanie Zabezpieczajqce, in 1 KODEKS POSTFPOWANIA CYWILNEGO 589 (Tadeusz Erecifiski
ed., 2006) with supra note 43.
82 According to art. 691 KC, a "close person" becomes lessee ex lege upon the death of a person
renting an apartment. However, one condition must be fulfilled: the close person must have lived
with the deceased person continuously up to the death. See also infra notes 102-03 and
accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., art. 827 § 3 KC; art. 828 § 3 KC.
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"'member of a family" in a broader sense and differently from the meanings used
in the KRO." Due to a wider definition of "close persons" in criminal law, for
example, cohabitants have a well-developed set of rights. Cohabitation,
however, is not a basis for awarding alimony between cohabitants 86-it is not a
legal union, and such a de facto union does not bear obligations of alimony
between partners. 87
These various regulations on cohabitation, however, do not amount to the
same rights that spouses have in marriage. Such rights would be especially
important in the law of succession and at the breakdown of the cohabiting
relationship. Instead, Polish courts have decided not to apply the rules governing
divorces at the breakdown of cohabitations, determining that the regulation of the
KRO on the breakdown of marriage does not apply to cohabitation. 8 It is not
possible to apply these rules because there is no gap in the regulation,89 and, in
fact, cohabitation is outside of legal regulation 9o-laws using expressis verbis the
terms "marriage" or "spouses" cannot be used as the source of rights for
cohabitants.
In Poland, there was no watershed case on cohabitation, like the Marvin
case in the United States.9' Perhaps such a case would shift the status of
cohabitants in Poland, but cases regarding remedies for cohabitation are rather
rare in the courts, although it is possible to find some decisions of the Supreme
Court regarding the property consequences upon the termination of cohabitation.
The majority opinion is that cohabitants may enter into typical contracts
(contractus nominatus) or other contracts (contracus innominatus) so long as
they are within the confines of the freedom of contract.9 2 Such contracts do not
have any consequences for third parties even if they are informed of the
8 See, e.g., art. 6 pkt 14 ustawy z dnia 12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy spolecznej [Social Assistance
Act of Mar. 12, 2004]; art. 111 § 3 ustawy z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. - Ordynacja Podatkowa [Tax
Law of Aug. 29, 1997].
85 See, e.g., art. 52 KK; art. 58 KK; art. 61 KK; art. 63 § 1 KK; art. 182 KK; art. 183 § 1 KK; art.
183 § 2; art. 184 KK; art. 191 § 3 KK; art. 261 § 1 KK; art. 542 § 2 KK.86 Nazar, supra note 51, at 924.
87 Stojanowska, supra note 57, at 277.
See, e.g., Uchwala Sqdu Najwytszego z dnia 2 lipca 1955 r., II CO 7/55 [decision of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Poland of 2 July 1955]; Wyrok S4du Najwytszego z dnia 6 stycznia 2007
r., IV CSK 301/07 [decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland of 6 Jan. 2007].
89 Sometimes it is considered permissible to make an analogy to the case of the breakdown of a
religious marriage. See MIROSLAw NAZAR, ROZLICZENIA MAJATKOWE KONKUBENT6w 52 (1993).
But this is not a common opinion, and, in the majority of such cases, the parties of religious
marriages are treated as cohabitants. See Wyrok Naczelnego SEdu Administracyjnego z dnia 12
kwietnia 2000 r., V SA 1512/99 [decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 12 Apr. 2000].
See also supra note 51.
90 See Szd Apelacyjny w Warszawie w wyroku z 8 paidziernika 1997 r. (sygn. I ACa 648/97)
[decision of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw of 8 Oct. 1997].
91 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121-22 (Cal. 1976); see also supra Part II.B.
92 Szlqzak, Cohabitation Without Marriage in Poland, supra note 51; see also infra notes 97, 132
and accompanying text.
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contractS9 3-this is one of the features distinguishing contracts of cohabitants
from marital agreements.
Cohabitation certainly does not limit the freedom of contract and
cohabitants can regulate their rights and duties using contracts not forbidden by
law.94  Such contracts may be connected with the personal relations of
cohabitants,95 and these relations often determine the provisions of the contracts
concluded by cohabitants. Cohabitants can also make an agreement concerning
the distribution of their property when the cohabitation is terminated. Such a
contract is not institutionalized by the law, but can nonetheless be created by
parties given their freedom of contract. This contract may be a kind of
framework agreement similar to the contract concluded by entrepreneurs. For
example, cohabitants may introduce the rules regarding their duties in the
household and toward children, their common expenses, or the place of their
home. However, the contract would be void if contrary to the general regulations
in force or the principles of community life.97
Unjust enrichment is another theory used by Polish courts in dealing with
the termination of cohabitations." Although this doctrine is available,
contributing money and goods to a cohabitant during the cohabitation is justified
even when there is not any legal basis for such contributions. In one of the cases
concerning cohabitants, for example, the Supreme Court in Poland decided to
apply the rules of joint-ownership and its dissolution," but this is an isolated
opinion. It is impossible to introduce a presumption that everything that is
acquired by one cohabitant is the subject of joint-ownership of both cohabitants.
9 For the consequences of premarital agreements on third parties, see Margaret Ryznar & Anna
Stqpiefi-Sporek, To Have and to Hold, for Richer or Richer: Premarital Agreements in the
Comparative Context, 13 CHAP. L. REv. 27, 52, 59 (2009).
94 See Uchwala Sqdu Najwytszego z dnia 30 stycznia 1970 r., III CZP 62/69 [decision of the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland of 30 Jan. 1970].
9 The cohabitants' personal bond forms one argument against the applicability of contract law to
cohabitation. For further details, see Brunon Paul, Koncepcja Rozliczeh Majqtkowych Miqdzy
Konkubentami, 3 PRZEGLAD SADowY 40 (2003).
96 Occasionally, the personal relations between cohabitants are so strong that performances of
cohabitants can be qualified as gratitude and courtesy services. The dominant opinion, however, is
that performances of cohabitants are non-gratuitous. See Nazar, supra note 51, at 956.
97 See supra note 92, infra note 132, and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Uchwale Sqdu Najwyiszego z dnia 30 wrzeinia 1966 r., III PZP 28/66 [decision of the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland of 30 Sept. 1966]; Uchwale SEdu Najwytszego z dnia 30
stycznia 1970 r., III CZP 62/69 [decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland of 30 Jan.
1970]; Uchwale S4du Najwytszego z dnia 27 czerwca 1996 r., III CZP 70/96 [decision of the
Supreme Court of Poland of 27 June 1996]; Wyrok Sqdu Najwy2szego z dnia 26 czerwca 1974 r.,
sygn. akt. III CRN 132/74 [decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland of 26 June
1974]; Wyrok Sqdu Najwytszego z dnia 16 maja 2000 r., V CKN 32/00 [decision of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Poland of 16 May 2000]; see also infra notes 126-29 and accompanying
text.
99 See Uchwala Sqdu Najwytszego z dnia 30 stycznia 1986 r., III CZP 79/85 [decision of the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland of 30 Jan. 1986]; see also Szlqzak, Cohabitation Without
Marriage in Poland, supra note 51, at 9.
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Furthermore, the expenditures made so as to improve the property of the other
cohabitant can be treated as not a title to purchase a share in co-ownership.
Nonetheless, one of the most significant problems for cohabitants is the
death intestacy. The surviving cohabitant is deprived of everything because the
only family members constituting intestate successors include children, spouses,
parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents, and stepchildren.' 00  The intestate
successor is also the local community and the State Treasury.' 0 ' Meanwhile, a
cohabitant, as a "close person" who lived with the deceased up until the day of
death, is entitled to retain the use of the dwelling and its household equipment for
a period of three months from the day of the death. 0 2 The source of much
litigation, however, is the division of assets when the cohabitant is a co-owner.
Of course, the consequences of intestate succession law can be avoided by a
well-prepared will. 03 This is possible because, in Poland, the same principles
apply to testamentary dispositions of cohabitants as to other persons. Of course,
the surviving cohabitant should take into consideration the legitim. 04
In sum, the rate of cohabitation in Poland has been increasing, although
not as much as in other countries. Any non-negligible number of cohabitations,
however, prompts courts to deal with important issues regarding cohabitation and
the protection of cohabitants, many of which parallel those issues in American
cohabitation cases.
IV. COMPARATIVE LESSONS REGARDING COHABITATION
As evidenced by the preceding consideration of cohabitation in both the
United States and Poland, the primary inquiry into the legal treatment of such
relationships is whether they should be regulated by law. The ensuing debate
reveals that among the most important considerations is the protection of
cohabitants upon the termination of a cohabitation. This goal has been
addressed, to varying extents, by the use of cohabitation agreements and the
' See Mariusz Zalucki, Inheritance Law in the Republic of Poland and Other Former Eastern
Bloc Countries: Recodification of the Circle ofStatutory Heirs, 14 ELECTRONIC J. COMPARATIVE L.
6-7 (2010), available at http://www.ejcl.org/142/artl42-1.pdf.
1o' The order of succession is crucial-successors are divided into groups and the next group comes
into inheritance when the previous one cannot inherit or does not want to inherit. See arts. 931-40
KC.
102 Art. 923 KC.
103 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
10 Legitim is a monetary claim that the testator's descendants-the surviving spouse and parents of
the testator who would be the heirs under an intestacy-have to the successor appointed in the will
(legitim, zachowek). This claim amounts to one-half of the value of the part that the entitled person
would have taken in intestacy. As a rule, the legitim is detached from the financial situation of the
entitled persons. It should be added, however, that a person who is permanently incapable of work
or is a minor receives a fraction that amounts to two-thirds of the part in intestacy. The legitim is
not based on the needs of the entitled persons. See art. 991 KC.
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theory of unjust enrichment. The shortfalls of these approaches, however, need
to be balanced against the consequences of increased regulation of cohabitation.
A. The Legal Regulation of Cohabitation
The push behind the legal regulation of cohabitation, and the imposition
of marriage-like expectations, may reveal a pro-marriage inclination previously
exhibited by a quickness to classify cohabiting relationships as common law
marriages. 05  On the other hand, perhaps legal recognition of cohabiting
relationships undermines marriage by conflating the two differing levels of
commitment, meanwhile obviating the need to marry to gain legal benefits.106 In
this regard, the law might influence couples not to marry.107
Whatever the case, the regulation of cohabitation is very complex.
Cohabitation is ex definitione outside of any regulation-an argument in favor of
the retention of the unregulated status of cohabitation.'0o Furthermore, it is
difficult to legally define cohabitation' 09-ncluding the necessary timeframe
105 For further background on common law marriage, see infra note 118. The primary distinctions
between cohabitation and common law marriage are that, in the latter, couples hold themselves out
to be married and are treated by the law as such.
106 For arguments against cohabitation as a legal alternative to marriage, see Duncan, supra note 14,
at 1001 (2003); Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815 (2005). But see Bowman, supra note 15.
107 But see Bowman, supra note 15, at 38-43 (arguing that marriage is so well-ingrained and
appreciated in American society that legislating on cohabitation has no impact on it); Garrison,
Reviving Marriage, supra note 54, at 284, 287 (noting that "it would be premature to write an
obituary for marriage," "marriage remains an important life goal for most Americans," and
"overwhelmingly, young Americans assert that they would be 'more economically secure, have
more emotional security, a better sex life, and a higher standard of living' if they were married.").
Professor Garrison also suggests that it might be possible that cohabitation is delaying, but not
replacing, marriage. Id. at 285.
1 This has not prevented an Israeli court from imposing marriage-like obligations on cohabitants
despite the parties' agreement and intention to keep the relationship outside of legal regulation. CA
7021/93 Bar-Nahor v. Estate of Osterlitz [1994] Tak-El 94(3) 1512. For a discussion of this case,
see Shahar Lifshitz, A Potential Lesson from the Israeli Experience for the American Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 359, 375-78 (2008). This approach may result in a marriage
against people's will. Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? A Liberal Analysis of
Cohabitation Law, 25 TEL Aviv U. L. REv. 741 (2002) (Isr.). The Law Commission in England has
also recommended regulating cohabitation, although not to the same extent as marriage. THE LAW
COMM'N, COHABITATION: THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF RELATIONSHIP BREAKDOWN: A
CONSULTATION PAPER (2006), http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cpl79.pdf; see also supra note 67.
109 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 769 N.W.2d 591, 591-92 (Mich. 2008) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) ("I
would grant leave to appeal because I believe that the test for 'cohabitation' that the Court of
Appeals adopted emphasizes definitions of cohabitation that do not square with the contemporary
living conditions of cohabiting couples."); Graev v. Graev, 898 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 2008) (litigating
the meaning of "cohabitation"). But see supra note 57, infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
2010] 387
UMKC LA WREVIEW
triggering a cohabitation, the starting point of the cohabitation, and the depth of
the cohabitation. 0
However, an important prerequisite to cohabitation legislation is the
construction of a definition of cohabitation. Although the characteristics of
cohabitation can widely differ,"' there are some common features which could
be used in its definition.1 2 Any proposed definition, however, should consider
the stability and continuity of the relationship.
In some countries, such definitions already exist to facilitate
legislation.1 3  This sort of explicit terminology is especially important in
countries such as Poland-a civil law country where precedents are not a source
of law and do not have binding force, being only guidelines. Even with a legal
definition of cohabitation, however, judges would retain a wide margin of
discretion, which sometimes permits bias when the judge holds a strong belief
that only marriage creates rights and that cohabitation is undesirable.
Nonetheless, some commentators have called for the legal regulation of
the rights of cohabitants. Significantly, certain cohabitants themselves want to be
given rights without duties,' "4 which could be controversial and the source of
many problems. For example, in such a case, spouses could feel unfairly treated
because marriage means both rights and duties."'
Furthermore, legal regulation of cohabitation might have several
unintended consequences. For example, any potential regulation of cohabitation
could create another set of relationships to replace it. The result might be the
existence of cohabitations regulated by law and the creation of those sufficiently
different to avoid legal regulation." 6 Moreover, the regulation of cohabitation
could weaken the institution of marriage because some couples, taking into
account the prospective rights of cohabitants, could decide to remain cohabitants
instead of marrying. In this way, the legislator would promote cohabitation."
Nonetheless, one primary argument often advanced for the regulation of
cohabitation is that it would protect the more vulnerable partner from unmet
expectations and exploitation. For example, if one partner contributes
nontangible value to the cohabitating relationship, this contribution might not be
110 Compare the problems mentioned in Stroud v. Stroud, 641 S.E.2d 142, 148-52 (Va. Ct. App.
2007).
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
112 For example, the definition of cohabitation could require a shared home.
113 Cohabitation was legally defined in Hungary in 1977. For further details about cohabitation in
Hungary, see Orsolya Szeibert-Erd6s, Same-Sex Partners in Hungary: Cohabitation and Registered
Partnership, 4 UTREcrr L. REV. 212 (2008).
114 Smyczyiski, supra note 55, at 462.
115 This is another way the law on cohabitation could be perceived to discourage marriage. See
sura notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
1 For example, if cohabitation legislation were triggered by a three-year cohabitation, many
cohabitations would end by that mark, especially if cohabitants were well-informed of the law and
preferred to avoid its reach.
17 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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recognized by the courts. In many contexts, this reasoning intends to protect
women from leaving the relationship with less than they contributed.1 8
However, cohabitation agreements and the theory of unjust enrichment may
achieve these goals without changing the unregulated nature of cohabitation.
These substitutes for the legal regulation of cohabitation are considered next.
B. Alternative Legal Protection of Cohabitants
Cohabitation is a social phenomenon"'9 that may be a basis for legal
acknowledgment. However, this does not mean that complete and developed
regulation is necessary. In fact, although the rate of cohabitation is increasing, it
might be precisely due to the status's freedom from legal regulation.
In any case, cohabitation should not be treated the same as marriage and
these two institutions are not concurrent. Instead, the cautious approach is
warranted and regulation should reach only as far as the basic protection of
cohabitants is necessary. 120 Any additional consequences of cohabitation should
be left to the cohabitants to determine. Using the freedom of contract, they could
construct their relationship in a way that fulfils their expectations and is not
forbidden by law. They may also structure their property holdings through joint
ownership. 121
In fact, resources might be better spent developing the contractual
framework for agreements between cohabitants and general rules on the issues,
instead of developing a comprehensive legal framework governing
118 It has been suggested that women may not be able to bargain as aggressively as men and
therefore need judicial protection. Andrew J. Cherlin, Toward a New Home Socioeconomics of
Union Formation, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 133
(Linda J. Waite ed., 2000) ("[W]omen do not bargain as far toward the margins of their power as
men do." (quoting Paula England & Barbara Stanek Kilbourne, Markets, Marriages, and Other
Mates: The Problem of Power, in BEYOND THE MARKETPLACE 163, 171 (Roger Friedland & A.F.
Robertson eds., 1990))). This may have been the reasoning, in part, prompting the imposition of
common law marriage on certain cohabiting couples. See, e.g., Jennifer Thomas, Comment,
Common Law Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 151, 157 (2009). However, the
question is whether the reduction of a woman to a certain skill set advances women in
relationships. For example, the courts have not permitted agreements for one partner to be "a lover,
companion, homemaker, traveling companion, and cook" because of its resemblance to a sex-for-
hire contract. Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 319.
119 Nowadays it is not an "undesired phenomenon," although legislators promote marriage and give
spouses more rights. See Szlqzak, Cohabitation Without Marriage in Poland, supra note 51, at 4.
120 For arguments in favor of a cautious approach in regulating cohabitation, see Garrison,
Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 1. But see Westfall, supra note 32, at 1490 ("The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and state legislatures should respond to the
widely felt need for greater certainty and predictability in this area by specifying the circumstances
under which cohabitants have claims against each other when their relationship ends and the
manner in which such claims can be modified or eliminated. For example, compensation may be
appropriate for a cohabitant who pays for education or training of the other party.").I Title and ownership would therefore be in both cohabitants' names.
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cohabitation.12 2  This is especially true given that the recommendation of the
Committee of Ministers in Europe states that "many problems concerning
persons living together as an unmarried couple may be resolved by the
conclusion of contracts between such persons." 23 Importantly, there are no
inherent obstacles, in either the Polish or American legal systems, to applying
contract law to cohabitation, barring conflict with public policy.124
Of course, when a cohabitation proceeds smoothly, nobody is concerned
with the consequences of a hypothetical breakdown of the relationship, especially
given that the cohabitants do not want the law involved in their relationship.
When the relationship fails, however, cohabitants attempt to find any legal basis
for receiving compensation from their former partners for their outlays, work in
the household, help in an enterprise, or other expenses made during the
cohabitation.125
If no agreement or joint ownership exists between the cohabitants, courts
often use the theory of unjust enrichment in awarding parties compensation for a
failed cohabitation. 126 The theory of unjust enrichment essentially permits the
court to order restitution in an unjust situation wherein the defendant has
obtained a benefit at the plaintiffs expense. 12 7 The court therefore must evaluate
the cohabitation and award compensation based on its judgment of the
122 This is especially true given that cohabitants still constitute a relatively small percentage of
couples. According to the Polish National Census of 2002, cohabitants composed only 1.8% of
families. Single parents were more prevalent-they composed 19.4% of families. POLISH
NATIONAL CENSUS OF 2002,
http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PUBLgospodarstwadomowe-i-rodziny.pdf. These
statistical data were collected eight years ago, and the situation has changed a bit since then, but
cohabitation is still not prevalent. However, this does not mean that it should be ignored.
Furthermore, these data could be misleading because some people conceal their cohabitation in
order to avoid losing privileges for single parents-they declare being single parents despite being
cohabitants. Such privileges were cited as a reason for cohabitation in Poland even twenty-five
years ago. See Stojanowska, supra note 57, at 279.
123 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 72.
124 Szlqzak, Cohabitation Without Marriage in Poland, supra note 51.
125 id.
126 Professor Sherwin argues against such restitution in cases of cohabitation because of the
remedy's expansive and discretionary nature. Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice:
Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 711, 712 (2006). See also Garrison,
Nonmarital Cohabitation, supra note 1, at 310 (discussing the equitable doctrines of relief,
including quantum meruit, the purchase money resulting trust, and the constructive trust); infra
notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
127 It is not easy to define the theory of unjust enrichment. For a survey of the various meanings
and implications of the doctrine, see Sherwin, supra note 126, at 713-17; see also Doug
Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement Process and Its Critics, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 933, 942 (2008) ("A court following unjust enrichment principles may reject an absolutist
view of property and contract and override particular property, contract, and gift doctrines.").
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relationship-no doubt a difficult task for courts, 12 8 but not entirely different
from those decisions made during divorce proceedings.12 9
To limit this judicial discretion, couples entering into cohabitations are
well-advised to seek a cohabitation agreement that establishes the consequences
of the relationship.13 o For example, property division upon the end of the
cohabitation is an issue if the partners do not hold property jointly.'3 ' Of course,
couples must be mindful of the public policy limits to the judicial enforcement of
these agreements.132 Nonetheless, the cohabitation contract is similar to marital
agreements in that it introduces the general rules on the property of spouses, but
does not cause the transfer of specific goods to other kind of property.' Instead,
the contract organizes the property relations between cohabitants.
Such cohabitation contracts, however, are not a basis for specific
performance.13 4 Instead, they show the aims of the partners and explain why the
partners decided to perform in this or that way. 35  If this objective was not
achieved, the rules on return of undue benefit are applied.'36
Nonetheless, these contracts may be controversial because while it is not
possible to apply rules of marriage to cohabitation, the possibility of cohabitation
contracts may permit the circumvention of this prohibition. This is why some
commentators argue that cohabitants should not be allowed to create, through a
cohabitation contract, the same or similar property regimes as the marital
property regimes. 37  Until recently, furthermore, such contracts were held
unenforceable as against public policy in the United States, which encouraged
marriage and discouraged contracts for sexual relations.13 8
128 Sherwin, supra note 126, at 733 ("Claims arising out of failed domestic relationships also raise
uestions about the capacity of courts to assess what is just between parties.").
' But see id. at 734 ("In contrast, divorce proceedings have tended to become more objective over
time.").
130 For further discussion on cohabitation agreements, see Margaret W. Hickey, Pitfalls and
Promises: Cohabitation, Marriage and Domestic Partnerships: Article: Estate Planning for
Cohabitants, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1 (2009).
13I See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
132 See, e.g., supra Part II.A; supra notes 92, 97 and accompanying text; infra note 138 and
accompanying text.
'3 For the meaning of marital agreements in Poland, see Ryznar & Stqpiefi-Sporek, supra note 93.
134 See Nazar, supra note 5 1, at 958.
' See Wyrok z dnia 12 stycznia 2006 r., II CK 342/05 [decision of the Supreme Court of the
Republic of Poland of 12 Jan. 2006]. According to this decision, it is possible to receive the return
of money and goods given to a former partner if a plaintiff succeeds in proving that they were
donations because the former partner gave a basis for the belief that the relationship would be long-
lasting. Id.
136 For further remarks on unjust enrichment, see supra notes 98, 126-29 and accompanying text.
..n See AGNIESZKA DAMAsIEwIcz, INTERCYZY I UMOWY MIIDZY KONKUBENTAMI: KLAUZULE
UMOWNE 198 (2008).
138 Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or
Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 163, 191 (1985). For a history of the public policy objections to
cohabitation agreements and cohabitation, see id. See also supra Part II.A.
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The practical problem today, of course, is the rarity with which
cohabitants enter into written agreements, even if it is a typical contract. In
Poland, more so than in the United States, cohabitation agreements are not
popular and are concluded very rarely, often only when the cohabitants are
lawyers or have substantial assets. Furthermore, upon the termination of the
cohabitation, it is hard to have clear proof of the existence of a contract between
cohabitants, as well as its terms. In such a case, cohabitants in Poland turn to art.
60 section 1 KC, which states that the intention of a person performing a legal
transaction may be expressed by any means that sufficiently reveals his or her
intention and a declaration of intent can be made by electronic means.139 In other
words, the cohabitants must try to prove that the conduct of their ex-partners
implied a contract.140 However, such proof fails when the contract needs a
special form to be valid-such as the notarial deed.141 When the proof is
successful, however, the court uses rules based on the contract. The civil-law
partnership is one of the most significant contracts, but sometimes courts are
reluctant to apply its rules.
The transfer of goods between cohabitants, in many situations, is actually
a contract of donation under Polish law. In this context, the possibility to revoke
a donation is essential. It may be done if the donee has been guilty of flagrant
ingratitude toward the donor.142 The lack of the definition of "ingratitude" allows
the inclusion of cases when a donee has, without just cause, left his or her
partner. However, this is controversial because the key feature of cohabitation is
that it can be terminated at any time by any party without the risk of negative
consequences.143 Nonetheless, to protect cohabitants at the end of a relationship,
cohabitation agreements and unjust enrichment remain alternatives to the
comprehensive legal regulation of cohabitation.
V. CONCLUSION
The increase of cohabitation in many societies, as illustrated in the
United States and Poland, has exposed courts and legislatures to many relevant
issues. Among the most important of these has been the protection of cohabitants
after an unsuccessful cohabitation. However, neither the United States nor
Poland has recognized the application of a comprehensive law on cohabitation,
instead allowing cohabitation agreements and theories of unjust enrichment.
"9 Art. 60 § 1 KC.
' But cf Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979) (rejecting contractual claims
between unmarried cohabitants due to a public policy "disfavor[ing] private contractual alternatives
to marriage"); supra notes 27, 37 and accompanying text.
141 Notaries have a more significant role in European civil law countries than in the United States.
See JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM X,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdfl$file/CivilLaw.pdf.
14 2 Art. 898 § 1 KC.
143 Szlqzak, Cohabitation Without Marriage in Poland, supra note 51, at 7.
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LEGAL TREA TMENT OF COHABITATION
Many issues, such as the financial support of any resulting children, are treated
collaterally under the law by, for example, paternity or contract law.
Although there are certain disadvantages to such an approach to
cohabitation, these shortfalls need to be balanced against the consequences of
increased regulation of cohabitation. Specifically, many of these relationships
intend to exist outside the domain of the law. 1" Furthermore, should the law
extend to cohabitation, another relationship status might develop to avoid legal
regulation. The result is that only in marriage do partners currently seek and
receive maximum rights and obligations.145  Cohabitants, on the other hand,
accept fewer rights and obligations, as well as less clarity during the duration of
the debate on cohabitation.
'" When it comes to the legal treatment of cohabitation, "we find two extremes: cohabitants have
little or no rights, or they have duties imposed upon and imputed to them as if they are married,
when they have chosen not to marry." Both have obvious disadvantages. Kohm & Groen, supra
note 5, at 267. But see supra note 9.
145 See, e.g., supra note 43.
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